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Since its inception in 2005, the European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU 
ETS) has been the world’s largest cap-and-trade mechanism for carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions. In January 2008, the European Commission proposed to amend the rules of the 
scheme “to strengthen, expand and improve the functioning of the ETS as one of the most 
important and cost-effective tools for achieving the EU’s target for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.” (EU, 2008) The main changes, which would take effect at the beginning of the 
scheme’s Phase III (2013-2020), include:
“- There will be one EU-wide cap on the number of emission allowances 
instead of 27 national caps. […]
- A much larger share of allowances will be auctioned instead of allocated free 
of charge. 
- Harmonised rules governing free allocation will be introduced. 
- Part of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from the Member 
States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order
to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly 
technologies.
- A number of new industries (e.g. aluminium and ammonia producers) will be 
included in the ETS; so will two further gases (nitrous oxide and 
perfluorocarbons).
- Member States will be allowed to exclude small installations from the scope 
of the system, provided they are subject to equivalent emission reduction 
measures.” (EU, 2008)
In this paper, I use the tools of microeconomics to analyze the effects of one of these 
proposed changes: the suggestion to auction off a much larger share of emission allowances.
In the first half of the paper, I provide a brief overview of the EU ETS, and discuss how 
emission allowances have been allocated during the first two phases of the trading scheme. I 
then discuss the effects of auctioning off more emission allowances during Phase III of the 
EU ETS. I conclude that such a change would reduce the windfall profits of the initial 
allowance holders, and provide additional revenues that participating governments could use 
to support a variety of policies, some of which I discuss.
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European Union’s Emission Trading System: A Brief Overview
The European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS) was initiated on January 
1st, 2005, pursuant to the European Commission’s Directive 2003/87. Not only was it the first 
multi-country trading system (ECX, 2010), it was also the largest emission trading 
mechanism that has, as yet, been implemented: The World Bank estimates that, in 2008, 
global carbon markets were worth $126 billion (€68 billion). The EU ETS accounted for 
about 78 percent of the volume of CO2 transactions, and for more than 73 percent of their
value (The World Bank, 2009). According to a statement by the European Climate Exchange 
(ECX), a marketplace for European CO2 emissions, the EU ETS now covers about 12,000 
energy and industrial plants in the European Union’s 27 member countries (ECX, 2010).
Since the beginning of 2008, furthermore, the EU ETS also applies to three European 
countries that are not members of the European Union, but belong to the European Economic 
Area (EEA): Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein (EU, 2008).
The scheme relies on the allocation and trading of “European Union Allowances” 
(EUAs), each of which allows its holder to emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide (ECX, 
2010). EUAs are allocated to specific industrial sectors through National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs), drawn up by the participating countries’ governments and approved by the European 
Commission. The NAPs cap the total amount of carbon emissions at levels that decrease over 
time (Carbon Positive, 2005). Each government, furthermore, establishes a national registry 
that connects to the registries of all other participating countries, as well as to the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL), a system that “records the issuance, transfer, 
cancellation, retirement and banking of allowances.” (EU, 2010)
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The EU ETS does not have a scheduled expiration date, and has been designed to 
operate in at least three phases:
 Phase I: 2005-2007
o The first phase has also been called the “trial period,” as it was intended to 
provide the experience and infrastructure necessary for the EU ETS to work 
effectively during the First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-
2012). Its adoption was motivated, in part, by a perceived “performance gap” 
in the EU’s ability to achieve its emissions reduction targets, but also by the 
Europeans’ limited familiarity with market-based emission control 
mechanisms. While the United States had successfully implemented cap-and-
trade programs (for instance, the SO2 trading mechanism under the Clean Air 
Act of 1990), only Denmark and the United Kingdom, of all EU countries, had 
some experience with emissions trading (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008).
 Phase II: 2008-2012
o This phase was designed to coincide with the First Commitment Period of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and to help European countries achieve their greenhouse gas 
reduction goals (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008). The Kyoto Protocol obliges the 
fifteen countries that made up the European Union before the 2004 and 2007
expansion rounds (also known as the EU-15) to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions by 8 percent.† Of the twelve countries that have joined the Union 
since 2004, ten have their own emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol that 
require similar reductions (EC, 2009).
                                                
† EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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 Phase III: 2013-2020
o If the changes proposed by the European Commission in January 2008 are 
adopted, the third phase of the trading scheme will see many EUAs allocated 
through an auction, rather than freely handed out. Additionally, there will be a 
single EU-27 emissions cap, as well as harmonized rules for the free allocation 
of some allowances. The scheme, furthermore, will be expanded to cover NO2
and perfluorocarbons, and will involve some redistribution to enable countries
with lower per capita incomes to invest in clean technologies (EU, 2008).
A Rationale for Trading Emission Allowances: Coasean Bargaining
In “The Problem of Social Cost,” a seminal paper published in 1960, Ronald Coase of 
the University of Chicago outlined what became known as the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960):
Even in the presence of externalities, affected parties can bargain towards an efficient 
outcome, as long as property rights are properly assigned and transaction costs are sufficiently 
low (Rosen and Gayer, 2008). Property rights, under this definition, are assigned “properly,” 
when they are complete (that is, assigned over all relevant commodities) and enforceable (i.e., 
other parties cannot make use of the commodity without the consent of its owner). (Skaperdas, 
1992) If these conditions are met, furthermore, the efficient outcome will be reached 
regardless of the initial assignment of property rights. 
Consider the following classic example: Fishermen fish in a river that is being polluted 
by a nearby industrial plant. If no one owns the river, the plant’s pollution will create a 
negative externality by poisoning the fish in the river, thus reducing the fishermen’s catch. 
Suppose, however, that the fishermen were given property rights over the river. In this case, 
Hlavac 5
the plant could negotiate to compensate the fishermen for the pollution it creates, as long as 
the marginal cost (including the marginal private cost) of doing so is lower than the marginal 
benefit gained from the extra production such pollution allows. Alternatively, the property 
rights could be assigned to the plant. The fishermen could then pay the plant to abate pollution, 
as long as their marginal gain from fishing in a cleaner river exceeds the marginal costs of 
paying the plant. In either case, according to the Coase Theorem, the final amount of pollution 
in the river will be the same. This outcome, moreover, will be “efficient” in the sense that
social welfare (which includes both the well-being of the plant’s owners and of the fishermen) 
will be maximized (Rosen and Gayer, 2008). For a graphical exposition of the bargaining 
process outlined in this example, see Figure 1.
The theoretical justification for the trading of emission allowances is based, in 
principle, on the potential for Coasean-type bargaining.‡ Negative externalities are clearly 
present: Greenhouse gas emissions can contribute to global climate change, the costs of which 
are not borne in their entirety by the polluters (IPCC, 2007). The allocation of allowances, in 
effect, assigns property rights over greenhouse gas emissions: In the case of the EU ETS, one 
EUA entitles its holder to “own” one metric ton of CO2 emissions. The use of a central, 
internationally recognized trading mechanism, furthermore, reduces transaction costs, and 
thus makes emissions trading feasible. The number of allowances that are issued puts a cap on 
the amount of greenhouse gas emissions.
                                                
‡ The analogy, of course, is not perfect: Examples of “pure” Coasean bargaining usually 
describe a situation, in which there are no externally-imposed caps on the quantity of 
production. Instead, the parties bargain towards the efficient quantities on their own. In the 
case of greenhouse gas emissions, however, such a cap is often imposed: This allows policy-
makers to set specific quantitative targets on emission reductions. The main lesson of Coasean 
bargaining, nevertheless, continues to hold: Trading between holders of property rights (here, 
emission allowances) will lead to the desired level of emissions at the lowest possible cost.
(Rosen and Gayer, 2008)
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FIGURE 1: COASEAN BARGAINING EXAMPLE (FISHERMEN AND THE PLANT)
The plant’s production pollutes the river, and is therefore associated with negative externalities equal to MEC, 
the marginal external cost. When property rights over the river are not assigned, the market mechanism will, 
without intervention, achieve equilibrium at point E1, where MPC=MB. The resulting quantity Q1 of industrial 
production is higher than the socially optimal quantity Q*, which is achieved at point E*, where 
MSC=MPC+MEC=MB. After property rights over the river are assigned, the plant and the fishermen will 
bargain until they achieve the efficient outcome (Q*). This outcome will be achieved regardless of which party is 
initially assigned property rights.
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Once emission allowances are allocated, their holders can trade them. In this way, 
facilities that can abate greenhouse gas emissions relatively cheaply can sell their emission 
allowances to ones that face a higher marginal cost of abatement. This process of buying and 
selling will continue until the marginal cost of abatement is equal across all emitting facilities, 
and an optimal (“efficient”) outcome is achieved: The cap-and-trade scheme will achieve the 
desired level of greenhouse gas emissions, determined by the number of allowances issued, at 
the lowest possible cost (Rosen and Gayer, 2008; Gruber, 2005). Such a “market-based” 
system of emissions reduction can thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions much more 
efficiently than “command-and-control” regulation, which imposes specific limits on each 
source of emissions (McCormick, 2007). Figure 2 illustrates how the trading of allowances 
can lead to cost-effective emissions reductions.
The Value of Property Rights Assignments
The Coase Theorem states that, if transaction costs are low and property rights are 
properly assigned, bargaining between involved parties will yield an efficient outcome, 
regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. The allocation of property rights, 
however, does have important distributional effects: The party that is initially assigned these 
rights can benefit by selling them to others.
In the previously discussed example of fishing in a polluted river, the initial 
assignment of property rights determines the direction in which payments flow between the 
parties: If the fishermen own the river, the plant will compensate them. If, on the other hand, 
the river belongs to the plant, fishermen will pay the plant to reduce its pollution. Clearly, 
then, property rights are of monetary value to their holder. (See Figure 3 for an illustrative
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FIGURE 2: TRADING OF EMISSION ALLOWANCES
This diagram depicts how two industrial facilities, A and B, can reduce emissions by the desired amount at the 
lowest possible cost. The distance AB represents the total desired amount of emissions reduction. The MCA and 
MCB schedules depict the rising marginal costs of emissions abatement for facilities A and B, respectively. 
Starting from any initial distribution of emissions reductions across the two firms (such as that depicted by points 
D and G), facilities A and B will trade allowances until their marginal costs of abatement are equal (MC*). This 
happens at point F: In equilibrium, facility A reduced emissions by AE*, while facility B abates by BE*. At this 
point, emissions have been reduced by the desired amount at the lowest possible cost.
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comparison of the distributional consequences of assigning property rights to either party in 
this example.)
The Allocation of EUAs: Free Allocation
As in our stylized example of Coasean bargaining, the initial allocation of emission 
allowances can have significant distributional effects in a cap-and-trade scheme such as the 
EU ETS, where bargaining takes the form of trading emission allowances. If, in the European 
scheme, EUAs are distributed across industrial facilities for free, their initial holders will 
enjoy a windfall gain (Deutsche Bank, 2006): Compared to a scenario in which they did not 
receive any EUAs, these facilities now do not need to buy as many allowances. If, 
furthermore, they are allotted more allowances than they need, they can sell the excess EUAs 
to facilities with a higher marginal cost of emissions abatement.§ Free allocation of EUAs, 
then, represents a one-time transfer of wealth to the facilities that received them from the 
government that issued the allowances (Kruger et al., 2007). Figure 4 depicts how a facility 
can benefit from being the initial holder of freely distributed emission allowances.
The windfall profits arising from the free allocation of EUAs appear to be significant. 
A study by Point Carbon, an emissions markets consulting firm, assessed the scale of windfall
profits in five large European countries – the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Italy and 
Poland – during Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS, and estimated them to be between 23 
and 71 billion euros (Point Carbon, 2008).
                                                
§ Some of these windfall profits will be moderated by the costs of rent-seeking. As becoming 
an initial holder of EUAs has considerable economic value, one could expect facilities that are 
covered by the EU ETS to expend some effort in order to secure allowances “for free.” If the 
owners/managers of a facility have political clout and connections, their plant may be more 
likely to secure an initial assignment of emission allowances (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005).
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FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS ASSIGNMENTS
(FISHERMEN AND THE PLANT)
If the plant is assigned property rights over the river, fishermen will pay the plant to reduce its production: At 
any given point, the fishermen are willing to pay up to the amount of damage caused (equal to MEC), whereas 
the plant is willing to accept a payment at least as large as the difference between the marginal benefit (MB) of 
additional production and the marginal private cost (MPC). The plant and the fishermen will engage in Coasean 
bargaining, as long as MEC > MB - MPC. The net gain of the plant will be between the area of the triangle 
XE*E1 and of the trapezoid E*YE1X, and its exact amount will depend on the parties’ relative bargaining power.
If the fishermen, on the other hand, are assigned property rights over the river, the plant will have to compensate 
them for polluting the river (at least by the amount of the damage caused, equal to MEC): It will do so as long as
the marginal benefit of additional production exceeds the marginal cost (which, now, consists of both the private 
and external cost). In this scenario, it will be the fishermen who benefit from having been assigned property 
rights over the river.
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An additional concern about the distributional consequences of the free allocation of 
EUAs includes its effects on the income distribution in society as a whole. To the extent that 
the owners and shareholders of facilities that receive free allowances are wealthier than the 
population in general, the free allocation of EUAs can worsen income inequality (Hepburn et 
al., 2006).
The Allocation of EUAs: Auctions
One way to mitigate the uneven distributional effects of EUA allocations is to use 
auctions. In fact, the European Commission’s January 2008 proposal to amend the EU ETS 
includes a suggestion to expand the use of auctions in allocating allowances: During the 
scheme’s Phase III, which is scheduled to take place from 2013 until 2020, the power sector 
should rely exclusively on auctions for the allocation of EUAs.** In other industries, the 
European Commission proposes that the use of auctions increase gradually: The use of free 
allocation should decrease linearly to 30 percent by the end of the third phase in 2020, and to 
zero by 2027 (Parker, 2010). These auctions would be conducted by the governments of 
participating countries (although cooperative auctions between countries are also allowed), 
and must be open to all potential buyers (Parker, 2010).
Such a dramatic shift from free allocation towards the use of actions would represent a 
major change from the first two phases of the EU ETS:  During Phases I (2005-2007) and II 
(2008-2012), participating governments could only auction up to five and ten percent of 
EUAs, respectively (Hepburn et al., 2006).
                                                
** In a concession to some EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, however, the EU 
ETS provides an optional and temporary derogation from the no-free-allocation for power 
plants requirement to countries that meet specific energy and economic criteria (Parker, 2010).
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FIGURE 4: GAINS FROM BEING AN INITIAL ALLOWANCE HOLDER
This diagram illustrates the distributional effects associated with becoming an initial holder of freely allocated 
emission allowances. 
If facility A is the initial holder of allowances, it will be willing to sell them, at any point along AB, for at least 
MCA,, to be compensated for the abatement that it will have to undertake. Facility B will be willing to pay up to 
MCB for the allowances. Suppose that, before trading begins, we find ourselves at point D and G. Trading 
between A and B will, eventually, yield the efficient outcome at point F, where MCA = MCB = MC*. Depending 
on the relative bargaining powers of the two facilities, facility A’s net gain (“windfall profit”) from trading the 
allowances will be between zero (if it sells all of them at price MCA) and the area of the triangle DFG (if it sells 
all allowances at price MCB). Clearly, then, facility A can benefit from having secured an initial assignment of 
emission allowances.
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With auctions, governments could sell EUAs to the highest bidder, rather than give 
them out for free. Facilities that face the highest marginal costs of greenhouse gas emissions 
abatement could, then, bid up the price of EUAs. As they now have to pay for their initial 
batch of allowances, the windfall profits from the initial allocation of EUAs are reduced.
In addition to decreasing the profits that accrue to initial allowance holders, the 
auctioning off of EUAs would yield revenues for the government. These revenues can be used 
for a variety of purposes. In order to fully understand the impact of auctioning off a larger 
share of emission allowances, then, one ought to examine how the auction revenue would be 
used.
The proposed EU Directive provides some basic guidelines for the allocation of 
auction revenues (Article 10(3)): At least half of the money raised will fund activities related 
to the mitigation of climate change. These include emission reductions, climate change 
adaptation measures, carbon capture and storage, and forestation assistance to low-income 
countries (Parker, 2010). To the extent that auction revenues are used to facilitate further 
climate change-related measures, Phase III of the EU ETS could, if the proposal is adopted,
be more effective at mitigating climate change than it would have been with the free 
allocation of allowances. In addition, governments can decide to use the auction revenues to 
reduce taxes, invest in selected industries, or fund other public programs: In such cases, the 
overall distributional effects of using more auctions in allocating EUAs will, in part, depend 
on the specific policies that the revenues are used for (Hepburn et al., 2006).
In light of the reduction in windfall profits and the additional government revenues
that auctions can produce, it should come as no surprise that economists, almost universally, 
prefer auctions to the free allocation of emission allowances (Parker, 2010). Industrial 
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businesses, on the other hand, have tended to oppose auctions, and favor free allocation,
especially if they have political clout that allows them to secure EUAs for free (Markussen 
and Svendsen, 2005; Hepburn et al., 2006).
Conclusion
From an economist’s perspective, the European Commission’s proposal to use 
auctions, rather than free allocation, more extensively in distributing emission allowances
during Phase III of the EU ETS makes good sense: In addition to reducing windfall profits 
enjoyed by the initial holders of EUAs, the auctions would provide additional revenue for the 
governments of participating countries. This revenue could be used to fund further climate 
change-related activities, reduce the tax burden, invest in selected industries, or to finance 
other government programs. Although the reduction of windfall profits can contribute to a 
narrowing of the income distribution, the overall distributional effects of the proposed 
changes depend on the specific uses to which governments put auction revenues.
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